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LIABILITIES OF CORPORATE OFFICERS FOR VIOLATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY DUTIES CONCERNING THE ANTITRUST LAWS
WESLEY E. FORTEt
Stockholders have become increasingly active in attempting to fasten
personal liability upon corporate officers for antitrust violations.' Such
liabilities could conceivably be imposed under either the law of fiduciary
duty or the antitrust laws. The law of fiduciary duty determines a
corporate officer's obligations to his corporation, whereas antitrust laws
determine a corporate officer's obligations to the public. The corporate
officer's obligations to his corporation may differ from his obligations
to the public, and the reconciliation of these obligations with the require-
ment for profits will cause legal and ethical problems for many executives.
This article is a review of the legal theories under which liabilities
may arise through the law of fiduciary duty because of a corporate
officer's violation of the antitrust laws. "Fiduciary duty" is used as a
synonym for the three broad duties of management (obedience, diligence,
and loyalty) 2 while "antitrust laws" refers to the federal antitrust laws
included in section one of the Clayton Act.' Conditions precedent to a
derivative suit (for example, whether demand for suit must be made on
the board of directors and shareholders4 and whether security for costs
must be posted)' are not discussed here and the stockholder's suit
against corporate officers for treble damages under the antitrust laws
is mentioned only briefly.' I have excluded any discussion of the unhappy
prospect of prison sentences for corporate officers' and have included
t Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 182 A.2d 328 (Del. Ch. 1962), aff'd,
188 A 2d 125 (Del. 1963); Knopfler v. Bohen, 15 App. Div.2d 922, 225 N.Y.S.2d 609
(2d Dep't 1962) ; Borden v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1962) ; see also the
cases cited note 15 infra.
2. See HENN, CORPORATIONS 363 (1961).
3. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1958).
4. For a discussion of the requirement of demand on the board of directors and
shareholders see HENN, CORPORATIONS 575-79 (1961); LATTiN, CORPORATIONS 352-56
(1959); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 345-48 (rev. ed. 1946). See also Note, Demand
on Directors and Shareholders As a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REv.
746 (1960).
5. For a discussion of security for costs see HENN, CORPORATIONS 588-92 (1961);
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 374 (rev. ed. 1946).
6. See text accompanying notes 12-22 infra.
7. The more important criminal prohibitions of the antitrust laws are found in
§§ 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3
(1958), and § 14 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1958). Section
14 of the Clayton Act provides that whenever a corporation violates any of the penal
provisions of the antitrust laws, the violation is deemed also to be that of the individual
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only cursory comments on the indemnification of corporate officers for
their antitrust litigation expenses and monetary penalties since indemni-
fication has been reviewed recently and adequately elsewhere.8 The law
remaining in the area encompassed by the title emanates primarily from
stockholders' derivative suits arising under the common law; and while
there are few such cases involving antitrust violations, it is here we will
focus.
Let us assume that P, the president of a large drug company, in-
stituted a policy of resale price maintenance in 1950 and personally
directed the following actions: (1) distribution to wholesalers and re-
tailers of catalogues listing minimum resale prices for the drug company's
products; (2) release of a statement to wholesalers announcing that the
drug company would refuse to deal with those who did not charge the
minimum resale prices listed in the catalogues; (3) visits by drug com-
pany salesmen informing wholesalers that the drug company would
refuse to deal with wholesalers if they sold to retailers who cut prices;
(4) visits by drug company salesmen informing retailers that both the
drug company and its wholesalers would refuse to deal with retailers
who cut prices; and (5) refusals to deal with both retailers who cut prices
below the suggested minimum retail price and wholesalers who continued
to sell to such retailers.' Assume also that in 1960 the United States
Supreme Court held that the implementation of this policy violated
section one of the Sherman Act" in a suit brought by the government
against the company and that, notwithstanding a discontinuance of these
actions promptly after the Supreme Court decision, a number of retailers
who were boycotted by the corporation and its wholesalers for price-
cutting recover treble-damage judgments against the corporation." Can
directors or officers who have authorized, ordered, or done the acts constituting the
violation. Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C.
§ 13a (1958), while technically not an antitrust law, is an analogous statute containing
criminal prohibitions.
8. See Note, Indemnification of Directors: The Problems Posed By Federal Sc-
curities and Antitrust Legislation, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1403 (1963) ; see also Bishop, Cur-
rent Status of Corporate Directors' Right to Indemnification, 69 HARV. L. Rav. 1057
(1956).
9. These facts are analogous to United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960), with the exception of the personal participation of P. No inference is intended
concerning the knowledge or participation of the president of Parke, Davis & Co. in
those acts which ultimately became the subject of the Supreme Court decision against his
company.
10. See ibid., in which the United States Supreme Court held, "In thus involving
the wholesalers to stop the flow of Parke, Davis products to the retailers, thereby
inducing retailers' adherence to its suggested retail prices, Parke, Davis created a com-
bination with the retailers and the wholesalers to maintain retail prices and violated the
Sherman Act." Id. at 45.
11. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), holding
that a boycott organized by a competing store for monopolistic reasons created a cause
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S, a stockholder of the drug company, recover damages in a derivative
suit against P either under the antitrust laws or the law of fiduciary duty?
I. THEORIES OF LIABILITY
If S sued under the antitrust laws, there would be a possibility of
treble damages1" as opposed to the compensatory damages which are the
maximum possible recovery under the law of fiduciary duty. In 1916
the United States Supreme Court held that a stockholder could not bring
a derivative action under the antitrust laws in equity because the defendant
was entitled to a jury trial in treble-damage suits.1" In 1917 the United
States Supreme Court held that a stockholder could not bring a derivative
action under the antitrust laws at law because a derivative action was
solely an equitable remedy. 4 These two decisions left stockholders in
a procedural dilemma from which there was no escape. The adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merging law and equity appear
to have resolved this problem.' On the merits, however, it is likely that
S would be told that he has considerably less than an even chance of
success in a suit against P for treble damages under the antitrust laws. 6
of action for treble damages under the antitrust laws. The refusal of the drug company
and the wholesalers to sell drugs to retailers pursuant to an implied agreement to main-
tain resale prices would also seem a basis for treble-damage actions. Compare Simpson
v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), holding that a supplier is liable for treble damages
if he uses coercion on his retail outlets to achieve resale price maintenance, ith Dart
Drug Corp. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 221 F. Supp. 948 (D.D.C. 1963), aff'd, 5 CCH
TRADE REG. II 71, 371 (D.C.Cir. 1965), holding that a unilateral refusal to deal is not
illegal under the Sherman Act.
12. See 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). The Attorney General's
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws suggested that treble damages be made
discretionary rather than mandatory. If this proposal is adopted the trial judge will
decide whether compensatory damages are sufficient or whether double or treble damages
should be imposed. The court could then penalize the purposeful violator without impos-
ing the harsh penalty of multiple damages on innocent actors. See ATr'y GEN. NAT'L
Coini. ANTITRUST REP. 378-80 (1955). This would obviate the possibility of trebling
treble-damage judgments and make an action under the antitrust laws a much more
reasonable remedy against corporate management. See text accompanying notes 12-22
infra.
13. Fleitmann v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
14. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
15. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2. See also Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297
(3d Cir. 1962); Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d
Cir. 1953) ; Kogan v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 20 F.R.D. 4 (D.Del. 1956). See also Schecht-
man v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Ramsburg v. American Inv. Co., 231
F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1956); Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955) ;
2 CCH TRADE REG. RE'. II 9044 ("A procedural dilemma which barred a derivative suit
for treble damages under the antitrust laws was eliminated by the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.") ; 13 FLETcHER, CYC. CoRp. § 5929 (perm. ed. 1961) ; Note,
Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUm.
L. REv. 570, 582-83 n.103 (1964).
16. There are no cases in which a stockholder has succeeded under § 4 of the
Clayton Act in charging his corporate officers with three times the treble-damage judg-
ments rendered against the corporation when the corporation was a participant in the
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While the literal language of the Clayton Act supports S's claim,"7 those
who have considered the question seem to agree that it would be unreason-
able to charge P with personal liabilities amounting to three times the
corporation's damages (which is nine times the damage suffered by
treble-damage plaintiffs who sued the corporation.)'" Since this type
of windfall was not intended for the corporation and this type of penalty
was not intended for the offender, the courts could be expected to leave
S to his remedies under the law of fiduciary duty.' S would not be
permitted to sue P in S's own right under the antitrust laws even if the
value of S's stock has been impaired20 or if S has suffered a loss of
dividends or income," because the injury is to the corporation and only
remotely or indirectly to S as a stockholder.'2
S could be expected to elect to sue derivatively for a breach of
fiduciary duty rather than for a violation of the antitrust laws. Early
cases indicated that the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdic-
tion over this cause of action.'2 The state court had jurisdiction according
to these cases because the allegation was that the officer had committed
"malfeasance" or an "ultra vires act" and state law governed these
claims.'4 The federal court had jurisdiction according to these cases be-
antitrust violation. The commentators agree that such a result is unlikely. (See author-
ities cited note 18 infra.) This must be distinguished from the situation in which cor-
porate officers conspire with another corporation with intent to act detrimentally to their
own corporate employer. See Rogers v. American Can Co., supra note 15, in which the
latter was alleged.
17. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
18. See Blake, The Shareholders' Role In Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. PA. L.
REv. 143, 157-58 n.63 (1961) ; Note, Stockholders' Suits and the Sherman Act, 5 STAN.
L. REv. 480, 491 (1953) ; 59 MicH. L. REv. 904, 909-12 (1961).
19. This seems desirable since the law of fiduciary duty is expressly designed to
adjust intracorporate disputes while the antitrust laws apply awkwardly (if at all) to
these situations. See 59 MIcH. L. REv. 904, 911-12 (1961).
20. Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958) ; Berg-
strom, The Private Litigant's Standing to Sue, 7 ANTITRUST BULL. 3, 17 (1962) : "As to
stockholders, the decisions are numerous and unanimous that a shareholder cannot sue
under the antitrust laws for a diminution of the value of his stock by reason of a con-
spiracy which injures the business of the corporation"; Note, Standing to Sue For
Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 570, 581-82
(1964).
21. Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Co., 30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y.
1939), aff'd, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940) (per curiam).
22. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. [ 9042: "A claimed injury to a stockholder resulting
from an injury to the business or property of the corporation is remote, indirect, or
consequential and, hence, not recognized under the remediable provisions of the anti-
trust laws."
23. See Hand v. Kansas City So. Ry., 55 F.2d 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) ; Guiterman v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 48 F.2d 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1931).
24. See Guiterman v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra note 23:
The particular ultra vires act alleged to have been committed arises out of the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. The Supreme Court of the State of New
York certainly has jurisdiction in causes in which stockholders charge directors
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cause the particular "ultra vires act" arose out of a federal statute, the
Sherman Act.25 In Meyer v. Kcnsa City So. Ry.2" the court held:
So far as they [the early cases] stand for the proposition that an
allegation that a defendant violated a federal statute is sufficient
to bring a case within federal jurisdiction, although the fact that
a statute was violated is immaterial to the plaintiff's cause of
action, we must decline to follow them. So far as the cases
decided that a state court of equity had power to redress a waste
of the assets of a corporation by its directors, we think the de-
cisions were rightly reached.2
7
After Meyer v. Katsa.s City So. Ry., it was recognized that the state
courts alone possess jurisdiction over the cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty28 unless that cause of action is joined with a related claim
under federal law2" or unless there is a diversity of citizenship and a
claim of more than $10,000.0 Whether S's claim for breach of fiduciary
with malfeasance. That such malfeasance may arise out of a violation of a
federal statute should not deprive the state court of jurisdiction unless Congress
conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts as to all rights and
remedies in respect thereto. Id. at 855.
25. See Hand v. Kansas City So. Ry., 55 F.2d 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1931): "The action
was begun in the Supreme Court of the state of New York and was removed to this
court, upon the petition of defendants, on the ground that the controversy involved a
substantial federal question to wit, the construction and effect of the Sherman Antitrust
Law and Clayton Act." Id. at 712 (citations omitted).
26. 84 F.2d 411 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 607 (1936).
27. Id. at 414.
28. See Clayton v. Farish, 191 Misc. 136, 154, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727, 745 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
29. Combining the treble-damage suit under the antitrust laws with the suit for
breach of fiduciary duty into a single action will cause difficult problems. Jurisdiction
for the treble-damage claim under the federal antitrust laws will not lie in the state
court. See 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958) ; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958) ;
Kalmanash v. Smith, 291 N.Y. 142, 51 N.E.2d 681 (1943). Jurisdiction for the claim
for breach of fiduciary duty will lie in the federal court only if there is a diversity of
citizenship and a claim of over $10,000 or if the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction applies
because of the related claim under the federal antitrust laws. See generally 1 BARRON
& HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 23 (1960). The doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction will apply if the federal antitrust question is not plainly insubstantial,
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933), and if the claims are two
distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action as opposed to two separate and
distinct causes of action. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933) ; 62 COLUm. L. Rv.
1018 (1962). If jurisdiction is obtained because a federal antitrust question exists, the
decision of the question against the plaintiff will not prevent the court from deciding the
nonfederal claim for breach of fiduciary duty. See 1 Cvc. OF FED. PROCED. § 2.237
(1951). If the federal court decides it has jurisdiction, it will then have to decide
whether federal or state law governs the non-federal claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), will not be applicable because this is not a
diversity of citizenship situation. However, it is likely that the federal court will follow
the philosophy of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and apply state rather than federal law to
insure uniformity of decisions by all courts within the same state. See 24 U. CHI. L.
REv. 543 (1957).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
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duty was in the state court or in the federal court on diversity of citizen-
ship jurisdiction"- or pendent jurisdiction32 the law of the state of in-
corporation probably would govern since the claim concerns the "internal
affairs" of the company."3
S might rely upon any combination of five different theories in
his suit against P. Each of these is analyzed below, and basic to all of
them is proof that the corporate officer's conduct actually did violate the
antitrust laws. Absent illegality, P's conduct in setting up a resale price
maintenance program would seem to be defensible under the business
judgment rule. 4 P was not a party to the prior actions brought by the
government and the treble-damage plaintiffs, and the doctrine of collateral
estoppel could not bar him from asserting that his conduct was legal under
the antitrust laws.3" The state court would thus be in the somewhat
31. The conflict of laws rule of the state in which the federal court sits governs
in diversity suits. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) ; Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). For examples of conflict of laws rules
referring suits for breach of fiduciary duty to the law of the state of incorporation see
note 33 infra.
32. The conflict of laws rule of the state in which the federal court sits probably
governs the claim for breach of fiduciary duty in pendent jurisdiction cases. See note
29 supra. For examples of conflict of laws rules referring suits for breach of fiduciary
duty to the law of the state of incorporation, see note 33 infra.
33. RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 183, comment b (1934) states,
Right to object to corporate activities. The right of a shareholder to object to
conduct occurring in the operation of the corporate enterprise is determined by
the law of the state of incorporation. This includes acts that are beyond the
purposes of the corporation, acts which are prohibited either by the state of
incorporation or by the state where the acts are to be performed and acts which
are alleged to be beyond the authority of the officers or directors.
See also LEFLAR, THE LAW OF CONFLICt OF LAWS §§ 95, 97, 98 (student's ed. 1959).
The law of the state of incorporation was applied in the following cases: Rogers v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933) ; Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962) ; Perlnan v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955) ; Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F.2d 44 (3d
Cir. 1948), aff'd, 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Maxwell v. Enterprise Wall Paper Mfg. Co.,
131 F.2d 400, 402 (3d Cir. 1942); Selama-Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Durham, 216
F. Supp. 104 (S.D. Ohio 1963). See also Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective
Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 193 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
However, the courts could also characterize a suit against the directors of a corpora-
tion for mismanagement as a "tort" (negligence) action rather than an action concerning
the internal affairs of the corporation. If the suit is characterized as a tort action, the
law of the state where the acts or omissions took place rather than the law of the state
of incorporation will probably be held to govern. See Platt Corp. v. Platt, 42 Misc. 2d
640, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
Additionally, when the only contact with the incorporating state is the incorporation
and all other contacts-e.g., residence of parties and witnesses, sites of property, prin-
cipal place of business, location of the disputed acts or omissions-are in the forum the
laws of the forum may govern. See Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268
F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959).
34. The business judgment rule is discussed generally at 3 FLETCHER, Cyc. COR'.
§ 1039 (perm. ed. 1947); HENN, CoaroRATIoNs § 233 (1961); and BALLANTINE, COR-
PORATIONS § 63a (rev. ed. 1946).
35. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942). Cf. Blake, supra note 18, at 158
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awkward position of having to either dismiss this case or determine
whether P violated a federal statute."6 If the state court dismisses the
case, S will have no remedy against p." The state court could and, under
these circumstances should, accept jurisdiction.8
A. ".1Malfeasance Theory"
The essence of the malfeasance theory is deliberate intent to violate
the antitrust laws as distinguished from a negligent or unintentional
violation. S would be likely to couple his cause of action for malfeasance
with a cause of action for negligence. (The individual defendants . . .
"knew, or should have known, that such course of conduct was in
n.64: "However, an adjudication in a Government suit or a treble damages action that a
director has been involved in an illegal activity is not res judicata in a later suit on
behalf of the corporation, nor will collateral estoppel necessarily apply." Whiting, Anti-
trust and the Corporate Executive II, 48 VA. L. REv. 1, 46 n.194 (1962). The finding
of a violation of the federal antitrust laws by a federal court involving the same conduct
by P will probably be most persuasive to the state court on the issue of illegality in the
fiduciary duty action. 59 MIcH. L. REv. 904, 915 (1961). Therefore, P may conclude
that it is better tactically to concede the illegality of his conduct. See Simon v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., note 36 infra, in which illegality was conceded under similar circum-
stances.
36. New York and Delaware seem to be the only states in which cases for breach
of fiduciary duty concerning the antitrust laws have been reported.
In the Delaware case, there was no dispute concerning the legality of the conduct
under the antitrust laws; therefore, the state court did not have to either interpret the
federal antitrust laws or dismiss the action. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
182 A.2d 328 (Del. Ch. 1962), aff'd, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
The New York cases fall into three categories: (i) cases in which the illegality is
conceded, Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct.
1942), aff'd iner., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st Dep't 1944) ; (ii) cases in
which the problem is not discussed, Knopfler v. Bohen, 15 App. Div.2d 922, 225 N.Y.S.2d
609 (2d Dep't 1962) ; and (iii) cases in which the problem is discussed in a dictum and
the dictum indicates that the courts will not take jurisdiction unless the illegality is
conceded, see Clayton v. Farish, 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; Borden
v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1962). Cf. Gomburg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp.
132 (E.D. Pa. 1955) for a similar dictum.
There does not seem to be any reported case in which a state court has squarely
faced the problem of either deciding the legality of a corporate officer's conduct under
the federal antitrust laws or dismissing the action. Most of the dicta which indicate
that the court would dismiss the action under such circumstances stem from Clayton v.
Farish. This dictum is subject to serious question since the court in Clayton v. Farish
erroneously believed that it did not have the power to decide the fiduciary duty case
when illegality was not conceded. But see 59 MICH. L. REv. 904 (1961), which discusses
the fallacies of that theory.
37. See text accompanying notes 27-33, supra. See Clayton v. Farish, supra note
36 at 154, 73 N.Y.S.2d at 745: "Any other conclusion would leave Standard remediless
for these losses caused by defendants' wrongful acts, since no relief therefor could be
obtained in the Federal courts." (dictum).
38. 59 MicH. L. REv. 904, 921-29 (1961) and authorities cited infra. The state
courts can and do entertain actions against corporate officers for breach of fiduciary
duty in connection with alleged failures to file proper federal income tax returns. See
Sellers v. Head, 261 Ala. 212, 73 So.2d 747 (1954) ; Coeur D'Alenes Lead Co. v. Kings-
bury, 59 Idaho 627, 85 P.2d 691 (1938). Such cases present many of the same problems
as cases for breach of fiduciary duty concerning the antitrust laws.
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violation of the Act.")" The complaint would allege that the willful
and intentional violation of the antitrust laws was a breach of P's
fiduciary duty making him personally liable for all damages directly
resulting therefrom. If P were to move to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action, the court would be forced to rely upon
dicta and analogous authority in deciding this motion since there are no
cases directly in point.
In 1934 and 1938, the New York courts were faced with somewhat
similar situations in Broderick v. Marcus4" and Van Schaick v. Carr."
In these two cases, the directors were forced to pay for losses sustained
by their corporations because they had knowingly violated provisions of
New York's Banking Law and Insurance Law respectively. In neither
case was there a corrupt motive of personal gain, but the court held the
directors liable." Both of these cases were cited with approval in Simon
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,43 which involved an alleged negligent
violation of the antitrust laws. A dictum in the Simon case indicated that
an intentional violation of the antitrust laws does create a cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty.4" This would lead one to believe
that in New York at least the business judgment rule would not relieve
P from personal liability for a deliberate violation of the antitrust laws,
even if P intended his violation to benefit the corporation.4"
The later case of Clayton v. Faris'46 caused some confusion. In
Clayton v. Farish it was alleged that the defendant-directors had entered
into a cartel arrangement which violated the federal antitrust laws. The
directors had allegedly acted in the interest of their partner in the cartel
arrangement rather than in the interest of their own corporation. The
court rejected the theory that the directors were liable simply because the
39. See, e.g., Borden v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S.2d 902, 903 (Sup. Ct. 1962). (Emphasis
added.)
40. 152 Misc. 413, 272 N.Y. Supp. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
41. 170 Misc. 539, 10 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
42. See cases cited notes 40 and 41 sapra; see also 33 CORNELL L.Q. 421, 424 (1949);
cf. JACKSON, CORPORATE MANAGEMENT (THE DIREcroRs AND ExECUTIVES) 370 (1955):
"So a director who knowingly participates in a corporate loan or guaranty forbidden to
the corporation may find himself subjected to personal liability for the losses thereby sus-
tained by the corporation."
43. 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mnem., 267 App. Div. 890,
47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st Dep't 1944).
44. Id. at 204-05, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 273-74; see also Whiting, supra note 35, at 44-45:
Finally, where there has been a per se or willful violation, should the responsible
executive be compelled not only to foot his own bill but to pay as well the
company's defense expenses and any fines or judgments, including treble
damages, it may have sustained? Although direct precedent is lacking, the
Sinon case and the analogies from other indemnification cases suggest an af-
firmative answer.
45. Cf. 1 HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE 539 (1959).
46. 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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antitrust laws were violated4' and stated that the alleged violations of
the antitrust laws were irrelevant and should be disregarded. s The cause
of action was treated like a waste of corporate assets case rather than a
malfeasance case. This approach probably indicates either that the court
did not realize that the statutory violation itself could be a breach of
fiduciary duty or that the court doubted its power to decide whether
a federal statute had been violated.49
Knopfler v. Bohen 0 dispelled some of the confusion created by
Clayton v. Farish. In Knopfler v. Bohen, the stockholder's complaint on
behalf of Allis-Chalmers Corporation alleged two causes of action. The
first cause of action was against the directors of Allis-Chalmers and the
second cause of action was against the directors, Allis-Chalmers, and two
other corporations, General Electric and Westinghouse. The first cause
of action was stayed and Allis-Chalmers moved to dismiss the second
cause of action for failure to state a cause of action against it or, alter-
natively, because there was no allegation of a demand on the board of
directors of Allis-Chalmers to institute suit against General Electric and
Westinghouse. The court stated: "The first cause of action is against
the members of the board of directors of Allis-Chalmers, and is based on
allegations that they engaged in a course of conduct to violate Federal anti-
trust laws, causing the corporation to pay fines and to be subject to treble
damage suits, with attendant expense. . . The second cause of action
incorporates all the allegations of the first cause of action, and so read it
alleges a cause of action against the individual and the corporate de-
fendants, with damages to Allis-Chalmers as the result of the active
wrongdoing of both the individual and the corporate defendants."'" The
only "wrongdoing" of the directors mentioned in the opinion was their
alleged violation of the antitrust laws. Therefore, contrary to Clayton
v. Farish, this court's dictum indicates that the allegations of an antitrust
violation are not irrelevant in a suit for breach of fiduciary duty in a
state court.
In the more recent case of Borden v. Cohen,2 the complaint alleged
a willful violation of the Sherman Act but failed to allege proper damages.
The complaint was dismissed. In a dictum the court cited Clayton v.
Farish with approval for the proposition that allegations of illegality
47. Id. at 153, 73 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
4S. Id. at 146-54; 73 N.Y.S2d at 737-45.
49. See note 36 supra, discussing the court's confusion concerning its jurisdictional
power.
50. 15 App. Div. 2d 922, 225 N.Y.S.2d 609 (2d Dep't 1962).
51. Id. at 922-23, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
52. 231 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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must be disregarded and allegations of disloyalty alone considered."3 The
court then stated:
No damage is to be inferred from the conduct of corporate
business which happens to violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
unless the acts constituting such violation also cause independent
damage to the corporation, and were against the interests and
the benefit of the corporation. Plaintiff appears to concede this
proposition and urges distinction by reason of the claimed
crucial allegations contained in the complaint that the individual
defendants in causing the corporation to engage in the course of
conduct violative of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and to make
such expenditures, did so recklessly and in violation of their
fiduciary duty and knew, or should have known, that such
course of conduct was in violation of the Act. Knowledge of the
violation is not an element which will give rise to an actionable
claim unless the acts otherwise worked harm to the corporation.
Plaintiff endeavors to supply such additional element by alleging
that as a further direct result of the course of conduct substantial
damage was caused to customers using the services of the corpor-
ation which was thereby subjected to civil suits for the recovery
of treble damage. The allegations are conclusory, particularly
in the absence of an allegation that such suits were successful
and subjected the corporation to loss rendering the defendants
liable."'
In S v. P, with the treble-damage judgments having been rendered
in favor of the claimants and the officer's acts having caused harm to
the corporation, it is likely that the New York courts would hold that a
willful violation of the statute causing legal damage to the corporation
creates a cause of action for malfeasance. Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co. laid the foundation for such a holding and Knopfler v. Bohen and
Borden v. Cohen appear to have repaired any damage temporarily caused
by the unfortunate dictum in Clayton v. Farish. Other jurisdictions
can be expected to reach a similar result5 although the decisions now
supporting a cause of action for malfeasance are few and far removed
from antitrust. 6
53. Ibid.
54. Id. at 902-03. (Emphasis added.)
55. See 46 MICH. L. REv. 683, 684 (1948): "It would be understandable that any
willful breach of a statute should result in liability per se for the directors, where such
a violation would result in criminal prosecution and a fine against the corporation."
56. E.g., Sellers v. Head, 261 Ala. 212, 73 So.2d 747 (1954) (president intentionally
filed false tax returns) ; Precision Extrusions, Inc. v. Stewart, 36 Ill. App. 2d 30, 183
N.E.2d 547 (1962) (directors purchased the corporation's own stock in violation of an
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While S's complaint for malfeasance states a cause of action, S
would find it difficult to secure evidence that P's violation of the anti-
trust laws was intentional. Direct evidence of unlawful intent probably
would be difficult to secure since, if it exists, it would be primarily in the
hands of hostile witnesses (P or his subordinates). Further complicating
matters would be the protection afforded opinions of P's lawyers by the
attorney-client privilege." Under all these circumstances, S might well
be forced to argue that the court should infer that unlawful intent existed.
Two arguments could be raised to justify such an inference: (i) the
violation was price-fixing, a per se violation of the antitrust laws," or,
(ii) the law prohibiting this conduct is so clear and unambiguous that the
violation must have been willful. 9
The answer to the first argument lies in Simon v. Socony-Vacuum. °
The antitrust violation involved in that case was price-fixing6 and price-
fixing was already recognized as a per se violation of the antitrust laws
before the offenses in Simon occurred. 2 The court in Simon refused
Illinois statute prohibiting such purchases when the capital of the corporation was below
a certain minimum); Hill v. Murphy, 212 Mass. 1, 98 N.E. 781 (1912) (directors inten-
tionally circulated a libel for their own personal ends) ; Pennington v. Seal, 49 Miss.
518 (1873) (trustee knowingly approved illegal loans of his guardian's funds) ; Thomp-
son v. Greeley, 107 Mo. 577, 17 S.W. 962 (1891) (bank directors knowingly approved a
loan in excess of the amount permitted 'by Missouri statutes). Cf. Note, Stockholders'
Suits and the Sherman Act, 5 STAN. L. REv. 480, 490-91 (1953) : "There are sugges-
tions in the law of corporations that directors are guilty of a breach of trust whenever
they cause the corporation to engage in illegal activity. At least this is so when they
bring about the illegal activity willfully or knowingly or for the benefit of other than
the corporation."; Whiting, supra note 35, at 44-45 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
AGENCY § 34, comment g (1958).
57. The attorney-client privilege is discussed generally in McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE
181-99 (1956). The opinions of P's lawyers would not be priviledged if S could establish
that P consulted his lawyers in furtherance of a criminal violation of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 200-02.
58. Cf. Blake, The Shareholders' Role In Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. PA. L.
REv. 143, 170 (1961), in which the author apparently assumes that the per se offenses
are always clear violations of antitrust law. However, this analysis overlooks situations
such as United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) and United States
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), which involved per se offenses in which the
law was not at all clear. See also 59 MIcH. L. REv. 904, 928 (1961), for the same type
of error. Both of these authors have apparently overlooked the fact that a per se offense
(price-fixing) was alleged in Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra note 36, and the
holding was no liability because the law was ambiguous.
59. See the cases cited notes 40, 41, 56 supra.
60. 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd meme., 267 App. Div. 890,
47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st Dep't 1944).
61. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
62. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), held price-fixing
illegal per se. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), then
seemed to indicate that price-fixing might be permitted in depressed industries. However,
in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940), the United States
Supreme Court held: "Thus for over forty years this Court has consistently and without
deviation adhered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se under
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even to find negligence and, a fortiori, it would seem that unlawful
intent could not be inferred from every per se violation of the antitrust
laws. This result is consistent with criminal antitrust cases for price-
fixing under section one of the Sherman Act and with many similar
antitrust situations. No intent is required in such cases other than the
intent to do the acts which constitute the violation.6" This is also consistent
with the origin of the per se classification. The per se classification is a
judicial invention and nothing in the federal antitrust laws or the cases
originating this concept indicate that it is intended to have any effect
in connection with actions in the state court for breach of fiduciary duty.
The per se classification is relevant in the fiduciary duty cases only if
it is used to support the second argument-that the law is unambiguous
and therefore the violation must have been willful.
64
The answer to the second argument lies in the facts. P instituted
his resale price maintenance program in 1950 and abandoned it in 1960
promptly after the United States Supreme Court held it was illegal.
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in 1960 declaring
the program illegal, the governing authority was United States v. Colgate
the Sherman Act and that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which
those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense."
63. No intent other than the intent to commit the acts need be shown for the fol-
lowing offenses: (i) price-fixing under § 1 of the Sherman Act, United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); (ii) monopolizing under § 2 of the Sherman
Act, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) ; United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) ; United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp.
295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) ; (iii) unreasonable restraints of trade
under § 1 of the Sherman Act, Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594 (1953) ; (iv) exclusive dealing in violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act, Standard
Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) ; (v) unlawful acquisition of
stock under § 7 of the Clayton Act, United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
353 U.S. 586 (1957).
64. Because the per se prohibitions are generally plainer than most, blatant viola-
tions of them are more likely to result in personal liabilities for corporate officers. It
seems certain, for example, that a court would consider a horizontal agreement among
corporate presidents to charge uniform prices as a willful violation of the law. The
same would probably be true of a horizontal agreement allocating geographic markets
among competitors. However, other combinations affecting prices may not be willful
violations even though they are per se offenses if the law at the time of the violation
is ambiguous. E.g., suppose that the Supreme Court holds, contrary to Theatre Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954), that conscious
parallelism conclusively constitutes a Sherman Act offense. (Cf. Winchester Theatre
Co. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 324 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1963) ; Independent Iron
Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 922 (1963), holding that conscious parallelism is not even enough evidence of con-
spiracy to permit a jury to conclude that there was a Sherman Act violation.) Such
behavior would be a per se violation but it is difficult to believe that a stockholder could
surcharge a corporate officer for fines imposed on the corporation in the initial land-
mark case establishing that new rule of law. There would probably be no malfeasance,
no negligence, and no breach of the fiduciary duty in such a situation. (See note 58
supra for further discussion of the relation of the per se doctrine to breach of fiduciary
duty suits.)
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& Co., holding that a refusal to deal with price-cutters was permissible.
A dictum in Frey & Sons, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,6 offered clear
support support for the belief that the Supreme Court itself had approved
refusals to deal with wholesalers who sold to price-cutters. FTC v. Beech-
Nut Packing Co."' and United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.6"
had made it plain that concerted action to maintain resale prices was
illegal but had not indicated (even to some distinguished members of the
Supreme Court) " that this type of resale price maintenance program
would be considered as concerted rather than unilateral action. In view of
this ambiguity, the court would be unlikely to hold that P's actions in
setting up this resale price maintenance program showed a deliberate
intent to violate the antitrust laws. If P had committed the violation for
personal gain 0 or as part of a personal vendetta,7 ' unlawful intent could
be inferred and liability would follow.
P could not defend his actions on the ground that they have been
ratified by the board of directors or the shareholders since there can be
no ratification of an illegal act. Once a court found that P's violation
was deliberate, P would be held liable even if he was ordered to commit
these acts by the board of directors or shareholders of the drug company.73
B. "Negligence Theory'
The essence of the negligence theory is the failure to use reasonable
65. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
66. 256 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1921).
67. 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
68. 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
69. See the dissenting opinion in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,
52-54 (1960).
70. See DiTomasso v. Loverro, 250 App. Div. 206, 293 N.Y. Supp. 912 (2d Dep't),
aff'd, 276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d 570 (no opinion), rehearing denied, 276 N.Y. 610, 12
N.E.2d 601 (1937), which stated that directors are liable to the corporation for entering
into an illegal contract to create a monopoly. This particular contract violated the New
York state law against monopolies but the same reasoning would apply to a contract
violating § 2 of the Sherman Act.
71. Compare Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305, rehearing denied,
297 N.Y. 604, 75 N.E.2d 274 (1947) (officers and directors may be personally liable for
a loss caused by the removal of a plant to punish a labor union) ; and Leech v. Fuller,
173 Misc. 543, 19 N.Y.S.2d 98 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 816, 20 N.Y.S.2d
398 (1st Dep't) (per curiam), rehearing and appeal denied, 259 App. Div. 876, 20
N.Y.S.2d 666 (1st Dep't 1940) (like facts and like holding) ; with Hornstein v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 22 Misc. 2d 996, 37 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 266 App. Div.
659, 41 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1st Dep't 1942) (no opinion), aff'd, 292 N.Y. 468, 55 N.E.2d 740
(1944) (per curiam) (officers and directors are not personally liable for payment made
to labor racketeer when the payment was intended to benefit the corporation).
72. 13 FLrrcHER, Cyc. CoRP. 122-23 (perm. ed. 1961) ; see also Rogers v. American
Can Co., 187 F. Supp. 532, 537 (D.NJ. 1960), aff'd, 305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962).
73. See Holmes, Booth & Haydens v. Willard, 125 N.Y. 75, 79-80, 25 N.E. 1083,
1083-84 (1890), in which the court stated that a subordinate officer may be liable for
ultra vires acts even if he was ordered to commit the acts by the directors (dictum).
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care resulting in loss to the corporation. The gravamen of the negligence
complaint may be in the failure to become reasonably informed of the
facts, the law, or both. To raise the question of P's negligence S's com-
plaint would allege failure to use reasonable care concerning the law;
that is, that P should have known that his conduct was illegal and would
result in damage to the corporation. If S also alleges a complaint against
the directors of the corporation his theory would be failure to use reason-
able care concerning both the facts and law; that is, that the directors
should have informed themselves of P's actions and that, having learned
the facts, they should have known that P's conduct was illegal and would
result in damage to the corporation unless stopped. Because actual intent
to violate the antitrust laws need not be proved under the negligence
theory, negligence would present a much more attractive theory to S than
malfeasance.
In all jurisdictions directors and other corporate officers are liable
for "gross negligence," and they are liable for "ordinary negligence" in
most jurisdictions."4 Assuming ordinary care is the test, it can be defined
as (i) the care which would be exercised by a reasonably prudent man;
(ii) the care which would be exercised by a prudent man under similar
circumstances; or (iii) the care which would be exercised by an ordinarily
prudent man in his own affairs. 5 It is doubtful whether these conflicting
standards make much difference in practical application.7 1 Ordinarily
there is no liability for mere mistake (whether of law or fact) .Y Unless
the plaintiff proves that the mistake resulted from a failure to exercise
proper care, skill, or diligence the judgment must be for the defendant.78
S's suit against P for negligence in instituting this resale price main-
tenance program would probably be decided in accordance with Simon
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 7 1 In the Simon case the directors had approved
the purchase of "distress" gasoline from small refiners as part of a buying
program in which other large oil companies participated. The United
States Supreme Court held that the buying program was an unlawful
combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade which was illegal per se
under section one of the Sherman Act." A minority stockholder brought
a derivative suit in a New York court to hold the directors personally
74. 3 FLETCHER, Cyc. CoRP. §§ 1033-35 (perm. ed. 1947); Cf. RESTATEXENT
(SECOND), AGENCY § 379 (1958); MECHEm, AGENCY § 524 (4th ed. 1952).
75. See 3 FLETCHER, CYC. CoRP. §§ 1036-38 (perm. ed. 1947); HENN, CORPORA-
TIONS § 235 (1961) ; BALLANTIN"E, CORPORATIONS § 63 (rev. ed. 1946).
76. BALLANTINE, CoR'0oRATIONS § 63 (rev. ed. 1946).
77. 3 FLETCHER, CYC. COP. § 1039 (perm. ed. 1947).
78. Id. at § 1040.
79. 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd inen., 267 App. Div. 890,
47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st Dep't 1944).
80. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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liable for breach of fiduciary duty. Damages alleged included fines
imposed on the corporation and its employees (two of whom had pleaded
nolo contendere) and litigation expenses. The directors conceded their
participation on behalf of the corporation in the buying program and
conceded the illegality of their acts."' The complaint was dismissed on the
merits because the directors had at most made "an honest and reasonable
mistake or error of judgment or of law." 2 Since the directors did not
know or have reason to know that their participation in the buying pro-
gram was prohibited by the Sherman Act, they were not held personally
liable for damages. 3 This is in conformity with the general rule applied
in mistake-of-law cases having no antitrust implications, and this rule is
supported by venerable authorities."
In S v. P, a court would face many of the same problems as the
court which decided Simon. The antitrust statutes are very complex and,
perhaps, imprecise," thus aiding P's defense.86 Advice of counsel may
be given much weight as evidence of non-negligence." At the time P
instituted the resale price maintenance program both the Colgate decision88
and the Cudahy decision 9 indicated that the program was legal.9" A
United States district court"' and three United States Supreme Court
81. Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 203, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270, 272
(Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd viem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st Dep't 1944):
"That the defendant corporation participated in the unlawful buying program is not
disputed. Nor is it questioned that defendants, as directors, participated therein in behalf
of the corporation."
82. Id. at 204, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
83. Id. at 205, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
84. See Scott v. Depeyster, 1 Edw. Ch. (N.Y.) 513 (1832) ; Cass v. Realty Sec.
Co., 148 App. Div. 96, 132 N.Y. Supp. 1074 (1st Dep't 1911), aff'd inem., 206 N.Y. 649,
99 N.E. 1105 (1912); Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872); Hodges v. New England
Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312 (1850); Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897 (1935);
see also Yap v. Wah Yen KIi Tuk Tsen Nin Hue, 43 Hawaii 37 (1958). Cf. Spirt v.
Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956).
85. Cf. The United States Supreme Court's celebrated dictum in Automatic Canteen
Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953): "[Precision of expression is not an outstanding
characteristic of the Robinson-Patman Act."
86. "Whether directors are personally liable for committing acts prohibited by
statute depends upon the nature of the prohibited act; whether the statute is plain and
unambiguos, and whether it contains a limitation or restriction on the powers of the
corporation or the powers or duties of the directors themselves." Simon v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 204, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270, 274 (Sup. Ct 1942) (emphasis
added), aff'd inem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st Dep't 1944) See also 12
N.Y. JuR. § 872 (1960).
87. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Burnside, 13 App. Div. 2d 982, 216 N.Y.S.2d 430 (2d Dep't
1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 960, 183 N.E.2d 825 (1962) (per curiam) ; cf. 3 FLETcHER, Cyc.
CoRP. §§ 1026-27 (perm. ed. 1947).
88. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
89. Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208, 210-11 (1921).
90. See text accompanying notes 65-69 supra, where the apparent legality of the
program is discussed more fully.
91. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 164 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1958),
rev'd, 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
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justices" expressed the belief that the Parke, Davis resale price main-
tenance program (similar to P's program) was legal. P terminated the
drug company's program as soon as the court decided it was illegal.03
Under the circumstances, it is likely that the court would hold that this
was an innocent mistake of law and dismiss the cause of action for
negligence.
S would encounter even greater problems in proving his cause of
action against the directors. He would first have to establish that the
directors were negligent in failing to inform themselves of the course of
action followed by P in the resale maintenance program. Graham v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. is a very similar case.94 In the Graham case
minority stockholders brought a derivative action against the directors,
alleging that they were negligent in failing to discover that corporate
employees were engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy which violated the
antitrust laws. The price-fixing consisted of rigged bids and agreements
to refrain from bidding. Damages alleged were fines and penalties and
possible treble-damage judgments and injury to the reputation of the
corporation. The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint
because there was no evidence which indicated that the directors knew
or should have known of the price-fixing. The Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal. The Delaware courts placed great weight on the
diverse nature of the corporation's products, the size and complexity of
the corporation, the decentralization of decisions in the corporation, and
the uncontroverted evidence of the directors' attention to the affairs of
the corporation.9" These seemed to be the bases of the judgment for the
defendants, particularly in view of the plaintiff's failure to advance any
persuasive reason supporting his argument that the directors should have
suspected the price-fixing.9"
92. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 49 (1960) (dissenting
opinion).
93. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 365 U.S. 125 (1961), indicating that
the Parke, Davis resale price maintenance program was also terminated promptly after
the Supreme Court decision.
94. 182 A.2d 328 (Del. Ch. 1962), affd, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). Graham v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. is discussed at 1963 ANN. SURVEY Am. L. 492 and in 35 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 619 (1963).
95. Id. at 329-30, 188 A.2d at 128.
96. An abortive attempt was made to convince the court that 1937 consent decrees
in favor of the FTC against the company should have put the directors on their guard
against further price-fixing. The attempt failed because none of the directors had been
in office in 1937 and the three directors who knew about the consent decrees were
convinced that the company was innocent and had accepted the decrees only to avoid
litigation expense. Id. at 331, 188 A.2d at 129. Additionally, the trial court thought the
consent decrees were irrelevant because the 1937 violations arose from a conspiracy to
charge uniform prices while the 1960 violation arose from a conspiracy to allocate bids.
Id. at 331. The Delaware Supreme Court did not comment directly on the validity of
this distinction.
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S's suit against the directors of the large drug company would raise
many of the same problems as the case of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co. Whether the directors should have known of P's antitrust violations
would depend upon the surrounding facts and circumstances.97 P's per-
sonal participation in the resale price maintenance program in contrast
to the participation of only minor officials in the price-fixing at Allis-
Chalmers would bring the conduct much closer to the directors' level. Since
the resale price maintenance program of the drug company affected all of
the company's products (whereas the price-fixing in Graham v. Allis-
Chalhers affected only a few of that company's products), a court would
be more disposed to hold that the drug company's directors were negligent
in not knowing the facts. This holding would not impose liability upon
the directors. S's complaint against the directors would be dismissed
because the directors (like P) would have had no reason to believe that
the resale price maintenance program was illegal.9" The directors'
negligence, if any, in failing to properly inform themselves of the facts
underlying this broad corporate policy of resale price maintenance, was
not the legal cause of the drug company's losses.
C. The "Per Se" Theories
There are two per se theories-the negligence per se theory and the
liability per se theory.
(i) The "Negligence Per Se" Theory
The essence of the negligence per se theory is a statutory violation
causing the type of harm which the statute was intended to prevent to a
person within the class the statute was intended to protect.9" When all
of these elements exist the judgment must be for the plaintiff regardless
of the degree of care exercised by the defendant."' 9 The statutory viola-
tion is considered to be in and of itself negligence." 1
The doctrine of negligence per se, well-recognized in tort law," 2
finds little support in cases involving alleged breaches of corporate
officers' fiduciary duties.0 3 This may be because stockholders in deriva-
97. 3 FLETCHER, Cyc. CORP. § 1067 (Supp. 1964).
93. See text accompanying notes 85-93 stupra.
99. See PROSSER, TORTS § 34 (2d ed. 1955); see also RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 286(1934).
100. See PROSSER, TORTS § 34 (2d ed. 1955).
101. See Ibid.
102. See Ibid.
103. The applicability of the negligence per se theory to suits involving alleged
breaches of corporate officers' fiduciary duties is supported by Lyons v. Corder, 253
Mo. 539, 162 S.W. 606 (1913) (failure of bank directors to comply with Missouri stat-
utes requiring the cashier to be bonded was negligence in and of itself) ; and by dicta in
Downing v. Howard, 162 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 818 (1947), and
Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 419 (2d Cir. 1943). The other liability cases seem
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tive suits have found it difficult to prove that the harm suffered by their
corporation was the type of harm the statute was intended to prevent.
In S v. P, the court would probably hold that the antitrust laws are
intended to protect the public generally,"" including the drug company.
Whether this is the type of injury that the statute was intended to prevent
is more dubious. S would be suing on behalf of the drug company which
has suffered damage because it engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy and
was thus subjected to penalties and treble-damage judgments. P was the
cause of the drug company's participation in this conspiracy. The anti-
trust laws were clearly intended to prevent the harm suffered by the
retailers who were boycotted in furtherance of this price-fixing con-
spiracy."0 5 The antitrust laws were also clearly intended to prevent the
harm suffered by the purchasers who paid higher prices for their drugs
because of this price-fixing conspiracy.' The third type of injury occur-
ring in this situation-the reduction in the net worth of the drug company
by the fines and treble-damage judgments imposed for the price-fixing-is
remote from the more evident purposes of the statute.' °7 That is probably
the reason why neither the Simon case0 8 nor any other case involving an
alleged breach of fiduciary duty concerning the antitrust laws has
mentioned the negligence per se theory."0 9 While there are no cases on
point, it seems likely that the court would dismiss S's cause of action
based on the negligence per se theory since the injury is not generally
to be primarily malfeasance cases or ordinary negligence cases. See Blake, The Share-
holders' Role in Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 143, 162 (1961), in which the
author states,
To argue that in general these cases support a negligence per se theory of
director liability seems unjustified. In most of those in which liability was
found, the court specifically noted that the statute was so clear that its mandate
could not have been misunderstood. Thus any act implementing a violation was
clearly either negligent and a breach of the duty of due care or, worse, a willful
act not to be imputed to the corporation.
104. The antitrust laws have long been recognized as designed for the protection
of the public. See 64 CoLuM. L. REv. 570, 574-75 (1964) and authorities cited infra.
105. The retailers have, of course, recovered for this harm under § 4 of the Clayton
Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). See text accompanying notes 10, 11
supra.
106. The purchasers would have a cause of action under § 4 of the Clayton Act,
38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
107. It would seem difficult under any circumstances to argue that a statute was
designed to prevent the injury which it expressly imposes for its violation. The legisla-
tive history of the Sherman Act does not indicate any such intention. See Letwin,
Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CmI. L. REv. 221 (1956), for
a general discussion of the legislative history of the Sherman Act. Indeed, Congress
was partially motivated by hostility to large corporations (especially monopolies and
trusts) rather than concern about their financial well-being in enacting the Sherman
Act. Cf. Ibid.
108. Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct
1942), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st Dep't 1944).
109. See the cases cited note 36 supra.
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recognized as the type of harm which the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent. 110
(ii) The "'Liability Per Se" Theory
The essence of the liability per se theory is a statutory violation
causing damage to the plaintiff. Under this theory, corporate officers
incur personal liability whenever they violate a statute. This approach has
almost no support."'
If S relied upon this theory, he would be confronted by a unanimity
of adverse authority extending from Simon"2 and Clayton v. Farish."5
to Borden v. Cohen."" Under these circumstances, S's cause of action
based on the liability per se theory would surely be dismissed.
D. The "Ultra Vires" Theory
The essence of the ultra vires theory is that a corporate officer
becomes personally liable when he acts beyond the authority conferred
on the corporation by its charter. The rule is usually applied when the
violation is clear or willful (even if it was intended to benefit the
corporation), such as when the directors take the funds of a business for
speculation in the stock market."' Since no corporate charter could
110. "The antitrust laws are designed to prevent injuries to the competitive economy,
not to prevent the financial injuries which a corporation may suffer in the form of
penalties, when its directors have led it into an antitrust violation." Blake, supra note
103 at 160.
111. See Rogers v. American Can Co., 187 F. Supp. 532, 536 (D.N.J. 1960), aff'd,
305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962) : "Indeed, any derivative suit which involves antitrust viola-
tions almost necessarily miust involve some breach of fiduciary duty or inisinanagement
by officers or directors, shice they have guided the corporation ito activities which
violate the law, or at the very least, have acquiesed in such conduct." (dictum) ; Coeur
D'Alenes Lead Co. v. Kingsbury, 59 Idaho 627, 85 P.2d 691 (1938) (failure of directors
to pay federal taxes on the advice of counsel resulted in personal liability); see also
the cases cited notes 56, 70, 71 supra. These cases have been classified by me as mal-
feasance cases. However, it is possible to treat the intention to violate the statute as
unimportant. If the cases are so considered, they become "liability per se" cases rather
than "malfeasance" cases. DiTomasso v. Loverro, 250 App. Div. 206, 293 N.Y. Supp.
912 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d 570 (no opinion), rehearing denied, 276
N.Y. 610, 12 N.E.2d 601 (1937), clearly seems to be a malfeasance case. In that
case the court said, "It was found by the trial court that they knew, or should have
known, the contract was unlawful, and that they entered into it for personal gain. Thus
they have violated their trust duty." Id. at 209, 293 N.Y. Supp. at 916-17. It is classi-
fied in 5 STAN. L. Rizv. 480, 490-91 (1953) as a liability per se case: "There are sug-
gestions in the law of corporations that directors are guilty of a breach of trust whenever
they cause the corporation to engage in illegal activity.", citing, inter alia, DiTomasso v.
Loverro, supra.
112. See note 108 supra.
113. 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
114. 231 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
115. See Felsenheld v. Bloch Bros. Tobacco Co., 119 West Va. 167, 192 S.E. 545
(1937) ; see also Hemsley & Co. v. C. C. Duncan Co., 98 Misc. 338, 164 N.Y. Supp. 282
(Sup. Ct. 1917) (speculation in cotton futures). Cf. Yap v. Wah Yen Ki Tuk Tsen Nin
Hue, 43 Hawaii 37 (1958) (indebtedness not permitted by corporate charter) ; cf. Fergus
Falls Woolen Mills Co. v. Boyum, 136 Minn. 411, 162 N.W. 516 (1917) (similar situa-
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authorize a violation of the federal antitrust laws, S could argue that
P is acting ultra vires and should be held personally liable whenever he
commits an antitrust violation.116
The ultra vires theory is, of course, merely the liability per se theory
masquerading under another name. Ultra vires is a misnomer when it
is applied to conduct which violates state or federal statutes rather than
conduct which merely exceeds the corporate charter.1 ' The same law
would be applied and the complaint dismissed,1 ' regardless of whether
S labeled this cause of action "ultra vires" or "liability per se."
It is possible to make a more sophisticated argument from the ultra
vires cases. Some authorities suggest that corporate officers are charged
with constructive knowledge of their corporation's charter whether or
not they have actual knowledge of it. 19 Under these cases when the
tion) ; Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Co., 370 Pa. 172, 87 A.2d 295 (1952) (pension
given to widow to express the corporation's sympathy regarding her husband's death) ;
BALLANTINE, Coa'RoATIoNs 166 (rev. ed. 1946) : "Thus the directors or other officers of
a bank become personally liable to the bank or its receiver if they authorize or participate
in speculation and its funds are lost by use for unauthorized or illegal purposes." Note
that these cases involving patent breaches of corporate charters could be classified as
malfeasance cases.
116. Cf. Guiterman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 48 F.2d 851, 855 (E.D.N.Y. 1931), in
which such an argument was apparently made. The railroad company allegedly acquired
stock in a competing company in violation of the Sherman Act. A motion was made to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and in a dictum the court said, "Now, in
the case at bar, essentially the issue is whether the defendant directors committed an
ultra vires act. That is the general allegation. The action rests on that broad charge.
The particular ultra vires act alleged to have been committed arises out of the Sherman
Act and the Clayton Act"'
117. [A]n illegal act or contract, defined as one expressly prohibited by the
charter or a general statute, or which is immoral or against public policy, is ultra
vires and also something more. It is illegal, not merely because it is ultra vires,
or beyond the powers conferred upon the corporation, but, as in the case of an
act of a natural person, because of its immorality, or of its being contrary to
public policy, or its being in violation of an express legislative prohibition. Such
acts, strictly speaking . . . are not classified as ultra vires.
7 FLETcHER, CYc. CORP. § 567 (perm. ed. 1964). The distinction between illegal and
ultra vires acts or contracts is supported by the following cases: Wagg v. Toler, 80 Cal.
App. 501, 251 Pac. 973 (1926); Mitchell v. Hart, 107 Ind. App. 548, 25 N.E.2d 665
(1940) ; State v. Corning State Say. Bank, 136 Iowa 79, 113 N.W. 500 (1907) ; Mary-
land Trust Co. v. Mechanics Bank, 102 Md. 608, 63 Atl. 70 (1906); Ely v. Oakland
Circuit Judge, 162 Mich. 466, 127 N.W. 769 (1910) ; Strickland v. National Salt Co.,
79 N.J. Eq. 182, 81 Atl. 828, aff'd, 79 N.J. Eq. 223, 81 At. 832 (1911) (per curiam) ;
Bissell v. Michigan So. & No. Ind. R.R., 22 N.Y. 258 (1860); Tourtelot v. Whithed, 9
N. D. 467, 84 N.W. 8 (1900); Staacke v. Routledge, 111 Tex. 489, 241 S.W. 994
(1922).
118. See Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup.
Ct. 1942), aff'd -nem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st Dep't 1944) ; 3 FLErcH-
ER, Cyc. CoRP. § 1024 (perm. ed. 1947).
119. See Cooper v. Hill, 94 Fed. 582, 587 (8th Cir. 1899) ; Percy v. Millaudon, S
Mart. (N.S.) 68 (La. 1829) ; Campbell v. Watson, 62 N.J. Eq. 396, 50 AtL. 120 (1901) ;
see also New Haven Trust Co. v. Doherty, 75 Conn. 555, 54 AUt. 209 (1903). Cf.
McGowan v. Wells, 184 Ky. 772, 781-82, 213 S.W. 573, 578 (1919) (bank directors are
presumed to have actual knowledge of the extent of the bank's indebtedness).
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officers exceed their authority through ignorance of the charter, they
become personally liable. 2 Building upon these cases, S could argue that
ignorance of the law is also no excuse and that when P caused the drug
company to violate the antitrust laws, P was either willfully violating the
antitrust laws or acting in ignorance of the antitrust laws and in either
event should be liable.
This argument overlooks the possibility of mistake of law. Ignorance
of the law and mistake of law are not synonymous terms."1 P could be
expected to testify that when he instituted the resale price maintenance
program, he thought it was legal. Even in the ultra vires cases, when a
corporate officer proceeds under a mistake of law non-negligently, he
is exonerated.' This argument also overlooks the distinction between
charging P with constructive knowledge of his rather limited corporate
charter in contrast to charging P with constructive knowledge of all of the
antitrust laws. The latter would be clearly unreasonable and the court
so indicated when it rejected this line of reasoning in Simon v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co.'
Regardless of whether S relied upon the simple or sophisticated ultra
vires argument, the judgment should be for P.
II. DAMAGES
If a court imposed liability under any of the theories, it would be
compelled to consider the subject of damages. The general rule governing
damages was stated in Clayton v. Farish."' In that case, plaintiff alleged
120. See ibid.
121. See Culbreath v. Culbreath, 7 Ga. 64, 70 (1849): "There is a clear and prac-
tical distinction between ignorance and mistake of the law. . . . Ignorance does not
pretend to knowledge, but mistake assumes to know." (emphasis in court's opinion) ; cf.
BLACK, LAW DIc'ioNARY 881 (4th ed. 1951).
122. See Scott v. Depeyster, 1 Edw. CI. (N.Y.) 513 (1832) ; Spering's Appeal, 71
Pa. 11 (1872); Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312 (1850); Alderman v.
Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897 (1935).
123. In Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct.
1942), aff'd nem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st Dep't 1944), the plaintiff
combined the ultra vires and malfeasance cases into a single argument. Plaintiff argued
that the ultra vires cases charged the directors with knowledge of their charter and that
the directors ought also to be charged with a knowledge of the antitrust laws. Plaintiff
then reasoned that since the directors were charged with knowledge of the antitrust laws
and had violated these laws, they were liable under the malfeasance cases. The court
rejected the constructive knowledge part of the argument, holding, "Obviously, no such
knowledge can be imputed to the defendants when they, in behalf of the defendant corpor-
ation, entered into the buying programs which were later held to be in violation of law."
Id. at 205, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 274. See also Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 182 A.2d
328 (Del. Ch. 1962), aff'd, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963), in which the plaintiff argued that
the directors should have been on their guard against antitrust violations because of the
prior FTC orders against the company. The court rejected this theory in part because
none of the directors had been in office when the FTC decrees were issued and most of
the directors did not have actual knowledge of them. See also note 96 supra.
124. 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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that defendant-directors had breached their duty of loyalty to the corpora-
tion and had violated the antitrust laws by entering into an illegal cartel
arrangement. Damages allegedly included loss of profits from a failure
to compete with the cartel-partner, illegal payments to the cartel-partner,
and a loss of royalties arising from a court decree requiring the licensing
of the corporation's patents free of all royalties.
The court held, "[O]nce liability has been established . ., the
measure of damage is the entire loss sustained by Standard, which should
include all damages or penalties paid by Standard to others as the result
of the self-same unlawful acts."12
In applying the "entire loss" formula for damages to S v. P, the
court would encounter two major problems: (1) what elements of damage
can legally be included as part of the costs of P's antitrust violation, and
(2) whether any benefits which may have accrued to the drug company
from P's antitrust violation can be deducted from the costs of the
violation. In addition to these questions of law, the court as fact-finder
might experience difficulty in placing monetary values on abstract costs
and benefits. The problem, while complex, is probably not appreciably
more difficult than the monetary evaluation of pain and suffering in the
ordinary personal injury suit.
A. Determining the Costs of P's Antitrust Violation
Plaintiffs in other fiduciary duty suits concerning the antitrust laws
have included as elements of damages the following: (i) counsel fees re-
*quired to defend the corporation in an antitrust suit; 2 (ii) fines imposed
on corporate officers who pleaded nolo contendere to antitrust viola-
tions ;12 (iii) fines imposed on the corporation for antitrust violations ;121
125. Id. at 153-54, 73 N.Y.S.2d at 744-45 (emphasis in the original opinion).
126. Smiles v. Elfred, 149 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1963, P. 14, col. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1963) ; Premselaar v. Chenery, Civil No. 6151, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Feb. 13, 1963;
Borden v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1962) ; Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), affd inem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47
N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st Dep't 1944).
127. See Koster v. Warren, 297 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Simon v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., supra note 126.
128. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 182 A.2d 328 (Del. Ch. 1962), aff'd,
188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963) ; Knopfler v. Bohen, 15 App. Div. 2d 922, 225 N.Y.S.2d 609
(2d Dep't 1962); Smiles v. Elfred, 149 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1963, P. 14, col. 6 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1963) ; Premselaar v. Chenery, Civil No. 6151, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Feb. 13,
1963; Borden v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1962) ; Clayton v. Farish, 191 Misc.
136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; Spinella v. Heights Ice Corp., 186 Misc. 996, 62
N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38
N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct 1942), affd inern., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st
Dep't 1944).
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(iv) possible future treble-damage judgments and litigation expenses ;.29
(v) injury to the business reputation and goodwill of the corporation;l..
(vi) loss of time of corporate employees;.81 (vii) payment of illegal
price discriminations to favored customers;'82 (viii) costs of newspaper
advertisements explaining the corporation's defenses in the antitrust ac-
tion;13 (ix) loss of profits from failure to compete;"34 (x) illegal pay-
ments made as part of an antitrust conspiracy;... and (xi) loss of royalties
from an antitrust decree requiring royalty-free patent licenses. 3
The courts have deleted some of these elements from plaintiffs'
complaints. When the corporation has paid the fines of the defendant-
corporate officers on condition that they plead nolo contendere to an
alleged antitrust violation rather than stand trial, the cause of action has
been dismissed. 37 A "contract" theory 38 or even "promissory estoppel"
theory 3 (quite apart from the possibility that the corporation could
otherwise indemnify the officers) 4 ° then precludes a judgment for the
plaintiff. The possibility of future treble-damage judgments (and litiga-
129. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., supra note 128; Knopfler v. Bohen,
supra note 128; Smiles v. Elfred, supra note 128; Premselaar v. Chenry, supra note 128;
Borden v. Cohen, supra note 128.
130. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 182 A.2d 328 (Del. Ch. 1962), afrd,
188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963); Premselaar v. Chenery, Civil No. 6151, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y.
County, Feb. 13, 1963.
131. Premselaar v. Chenery, supra note 30.
132. See Diamond v. Davis, 263 App. Div. 68, 31 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1st Dep't 1941);
Hoffman v. Abbott, 180 Misc. 590, 40 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
133. See Hoffman v. Abbott, supra note 132.
134. See Clayton v. Farish, 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct 1947).
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. See Koster v. Warren, 297 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1961) (dictum); Simon v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), affd nere.,
267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st Dep't 1944).
138. The contract theory is supported by the holding in Simon v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., supra note 137, and the dictum in Koster v. Warren, supra note 137. The anti-
trust laws provide that a final judgment in favor of the United States under the anti-
trust laws may be used as prima facie evidence against the same defendant in a treble-
damage suit brought under the antitrust laws. See 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 16 (1958). A judgment of conviction entered upon a plea of iwlo contendere is
probably not prima facie evidence in a subsequent treble-damage suit. See Simco Sales
Serv., Inc. v. Air Reduction Co., 213 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1963). The courts frequently
refuse to accept a plea of nolo cmtendere from one defendant unless all defendants in
the same action make a similar plea. Cf. Koster v. Warren, supra note 137 at 423.
Under these circumstances it is important for the corporation to persuade the individual
defendants to plead ola contendere to avoid the possibility of an adverse judgment in
the antitrust case which would be prima facie evidence in the subsequent treble-damage
actions. The individual defendant's promise to enter such a plea becomes the considera-
tion for the corporation's promise to pay his fine.
139. Cf. RESTATEnmENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
140. Cf. N.Y. Bus. CoRaP. LAW § 723 which appears to permit such indemnification
when the corporate officer reasonably believed he was acting in the best interests of the
corporation and had no reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful.
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tion expenses) has been deleted from complaints as "conclusory."''
Causes of action to recover for newspaper advertisements which explained
the corporation's defense in the antitrust case have been dismissed be-
cause the expenditures were within the business judgment rule.'42 The
other elements of damages have either been sustained by the courts or
have not been ruled on by the courts in cases involving a net loss from an
antitrust violation.43
S probably would allege that the out-of-pocket costs of P's antitrust
violation were (i) the fines imposed on the drug company; (ii) the
treble-damage judgments recovered by the retailer; and (iii) the counsel
fees and other litigation expenses incurred in the government and treble-
damage suits. He might include with these allegations for out-of-pocket
costs some allegations for more abstract costs. Some examples are (i)
injury to the business reputation and goodwill of the corporation;
(ii) loss of time of corporate employees in connection with the antitrust
and treble-damage suits; and (iii) loss of profits from the refusals to
sell to retailers who were deviating from the listed prices and to whole-
salers who were selling to such retailers. The combination of these out-
of-pocket and abstract costs, if supported by satisfactory evidence, would
probably be accepted by the court as the total costs of P's antitrust
violation.
B. Deducting the Benefits of P's Antitrust Violations
Upon determining the total costs of P's antitrust violations, the court
would be compelled to consider whether P's action resulted in any benefits
to the corporation and, if it did, whether the benefits might offset in
whole or in part the total costs of Ps action. Pleading and burden of
proof would be of crucial importance to the litigants in this part of the
lawsuit.
Generally, when the defendant's wrong not only has caused damage
but also has conferred a benefit upon the plaintiff which he would not
have otherwise received, the value of this benefit must be credited to the
defendant in assessing the damage. 4 This rule has been applied in suits
141. See Smiles v. Elfred, 149 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1963, P. 14, col. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct
1963): "The anticipated damages allegations do not constitute present or existing dam-
ages and are not properly pleaded as damages, 'in the absence of an allegation that such
suits were successful and subjected the corporation (Olin) to loss rendering the defen-
dants liable'."; Borden v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S.2d 902, 903-04 (Sup. Ct. 1962): "The
allegations are conclusory, particularly in the absence of an allegation that such suits
were successful and subjected the corporation to loss rendering the defendants liable."
142. See Hoffman v. Abbott, 180 Misc. 590, 40 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
143. See cases cited notes 126-36 supra.
144. See McCoRmicx, DAMAGES § 40 (1935).
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for breach of fiduciary duty concerning the antitrust laws. 4 ' Yet, this
rather simple rule of damages presents the courts with a very thorny
question: whether S must preclude the possibility that the corporation
profited from the antitrust violation in his complaint or whether P must
plead that the gains exceeded the losses in his answer. In favor of
requiring S to preclude gain is the argument that normally in derivative
suits the plaintiff-stockholder must allege material facts constituting a
prima facie showing of damage or his complaint will be dismissed.'
In favor of requiring P to plead gain as a defense is the argument that
P and his subordinates (rather than S) know whether the corporation
has benefitted and what facts can be pleaded to show this benefit. The
New York courts have considered several situations analogous to S v. P.
In Diamond v. Davis,4" the plaintiff-stockholder alleged that the
defendant-directors had given favored dealers price discriminations and
allowances in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. The court dismissed
the complaint because the illegality was not properly alleged and be-
cause ". . . the acts complained of . . . are not such that injury to the
corporation would ordinarily be inferred therefrom as the natural and
probable result thereof. Facts establishing damage . . . should be
pleaded."'48 The court, in the later case of Hoffmanw v. Abbott,49 which
involved similar facts, dismissed the cause of action because the facts were
not properly pleaded and because, "Moreover, no facts are set forth
showing any damage to the corporations as a result of the acts complained
of. On the contrary, the nature of those acts is not such, in the ordinary
course, as to result in loss.""'
Substantially the same reasoning was relied upon in Spinella v.
Heights Ice Corp.,"' where the plaintiff-stockholder alleged that de-
fendant-officers had caused the corporation to violate the antitrust laws
and that the corporation had been fined when it pleaded nolo contendere
to the alleged violation. The court noted that the fine was $1,000
and yet dismissed the complaint." 2
Since the cases just discussed were decided approximately twenty
145. See Smiles v. Elfred, 149 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1963, P. 14, col. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1963) ; cf. the cases cited at notes 147, 149, 151, 153 infra; see also Whiting, Antitrust
and the Corporate Executive II, 48 VA. L. REv. 1, 46 (1962), wherein the author takes
the position that proof of a net loss will probably be necessary.
146. See 13 FLET HER, CYc. CoRP. § 5947 (perm. ed. 1961) ; BALLANTINE, CORPORA-
TIONS § 143 (rev. ed. 1946) ; McCoRimcK, DAMAGES § 14 (1935).
147. 263 App. Div. 68, 31 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1st Dep't 1941).
148. Id. at 69, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
149. 180 Misc. 590, 40 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
150. Id. at 596, 40 N.Y.S.2d at 527.
151. 186 Misc. 996, 62 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
152. Id. at 997, 62 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
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years ago, one may properly question their value as precedent in the
rapidly changing field of antitrust litigation. However, recent cases have
sustained and added to the vitality of the earlier cases.
In Borden v. Cohen,'53 the plaintiff-stockholder alleged that the de-
fendant-officers had caused the corporation to violate the antitrust laws
and that the corporation had pleaded nolo contendere and was fined $50,-
000. The court dismissed the complaint stating, "No damage is to be
inferred from the conduct of corporate business which happens to violate
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act unless the acts constituting such violation
also cause independent damage to the corporation, and were against the
interests and the benefit of the corporation."' 54
In Smiles v. Elfred,"5 ' the plaintiff-stockholder alleged that the de-
fendant-directors and their co-conspirators caused the corporation to
violate the antitrust laws and that therefore the corporation was fined
$20,000 and had to pay litigation expenses. The court dismissed the
complaint against the co-conspirators, holding:
It is not sufficient simply to state that damage did in fact
result; but the facts should be alleged from which the court can
see, if the facts are true, that damage would naturally or possibly
result from the acts stated.
The serious weakness in plaintiff's complaint, whatever the
relief sought may be, lies in the fact that damage in a situation
such as is presented in this complaint may not be presumed from
the mere imposition of a fine, the expenditure of specified sub-
stantial sums of money in defending criminal contempt proceed-
ings or the exposure to anti-trust suits on the part of customers,
in the absence of allegations in the complaint excluding the
possibility that "Olin" may have gained more from the price-
fixing conspiracy than the amounts of the fine paid and the
expenditures said to have been incurred or risked. For this
reason if no other, this derivative stockholder's complaint is
defective in law.'
The above cases support the view that S must plead the facts which
show that the corporation suffered a net loss from P's antitrust violations.
An unreported New York case 5. is contra and an older New York case 8
153. 231 N.Y.S2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
154. Id. at 903.
155. 149 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1963, p. 14, col. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).
156. Ibid. (citations omitted).
157. Premselaar v. Chenery, Civil No. 6151, N.Y. Sup. Ct, N.Y. County, Feb. 13,
1963, is discussed in Note, Pleading and Proof of Damages in Stockholders Derivative
Actions Based on Antitrust Contvictions, 64 CoLumx. L. REv. 174 (1964).
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(which does not directly discuss the question) offers some support for a
contrary result.
It has been argued that after S has pleaded a net loss and established
a breach of fiduciary duty resulting in a fine and treble-damage judg-
ments against the drug company, the court should shift the burden of
proving offsetting gains to P. ' There are no cases directly in point but
the courts have shifted the burden of proof similarly in cases in which
directors approved transactions in which they had a personal interest.'
Such a shift would avoid the anomaly of requiring S to prove a negative--
that P's acts did not benefit the drug company. It would also place the
burden of proof upon the party who has the most knowledge of the
benefits which have accrued to the drug company through the antitrust
violation.' 6' If the burden is placed on P, he may be able to show that
his antitrust violations in connection with the resale price maintenance
policy enabled the drug company to retain many of the higher quality
stores as distributors of its products and that the sales and goodwill of
the company were increased through this policy. This evidence should
be accepted as it is almost the converse of the plaintiff's evidence-that
sales and goodwill were decreased by reason of the antitrust suit and
the conduct which resulted in the antitrust suit.
CONCLUSION
Many of the problems arising from a corporate officer's alleged
breach of his fiduciary duty concerning the antitrust laws will not be
resolved in the immediate future. 62 In general, the courts are approaching
these problems with commendable restraint, imposing liability only when
the antitrust violation is willful or negligent and has resulted in a net
loss to the corporation. This probably reflects a judicial recognition of
the difficulties in understanding the sweeping commands of the antitrust
laws and the vast difference between the fiduciary character of a corporate
officer and the fiduciary character of a trustee under a will or deed of
trust.' This difference lies primarily in the corporation's requirements
158. See Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343, 118 N.Y. Supp. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
159. This type of shift is advocated in Note, supra note 157 at 178-79.
160. See 3 FLETCHER, CYc. CORP. §§ 931, 974 (perm. ed. 1947) ; HENN, CORPORA-
TIONS § 239 (1961) ; BALLANTINE, COROA0TIO NS § 70 (rev. ed. 1946).
161. See note 157 supra.
162. Despite an increase in complaints alleging such causes of action (see cases
cited notes 1, 15 supra), most jurisdictions still do not have a single reported case on this
subject.
163. See Hunt v. Aufderheide, 330 Pa. 362, 376-77, 199 Atl. 345, 352 (1938):
Most all business . . . involves speculative elements. The fiduciary character
of the directors' relation to the corporation and the measure of their responsibility
are quite different from those of a trustee under a will or a deed; such a trustee
must preserve the principal for the benefit of remaindermen, and at the same
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for financial growth which can best be fulfilled without placing undue
restrictions upon the members of the managerial group.164
time, within the restricted field of investment prescribed by law, obtain income
for parties presently entitled. But the assets of a business corporation are held
in a lighter grasp; shares of stock are taken with notice that the assets shall be
employed in making a profit, and that it is customary to take business risks
(dictum).
164. Cf. Ibid. Criminal prosecutions of corporate officers for antitrust violations
have been relatively infrequent and the corporations have usually been charged with, and
have absorbed, the more drastic monetary penalties. If the courts surcharge corporate
officers with their corporation's monetary penalties under a "liability per se" or similar
rule (see text accompanying notes 99-123 supra), the aggressiveness of management may
be curbed at the cost of lower profits to their corporations.
